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The grabbed state: lawyers,
politics and public land in Kenya*
AMBREENA MANJI
British Institute in Eastern Africa, PO Box , Nairobi, Kenya
Email: ambreena.manji@biea.ac.uk
A B S T R A C T
In , Kenya’s new National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) undertook to
investigate and ensure the recovery of all public lands illegally allocated by the
outgoing government. A Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal and Irregular
Allocation of Public Land, chaired by the lawyer Paul Ndung’u, was appointed.
The commission’s report sets out the illegal land awards made to powerful
individuals and families, provides important information about the mechanisms
by which public land was misallocated, and shows how the doctrine that
public land should be administered and allocated ‘in the public interest’ was
consistently perverted. This paper explores what the Ndung’u report tells us
about the role of the legal profession in the illegal and irregular misallocation of
public land. It makes clear that the legal profession, far from upholding the rule
of law, has played a central role in land corruption, using its professional skills
and networks to accumulate personal wealth for itself and others. This stands in
contrast to the role of the legal profession in promoting good governance and
the rule of law envisaged by donors of international development aid. This
paper focuses on ‘local’ land grabbing, and argues that the ‘global land grab’ or
‘investor rush’ needs to be understood alongside local manifestations of land
privatisation.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In , Kenya’s ruling political party since independence in ,
KANU, was defeated in the elections by the National Rainbow Coalition
(NARC) headed by Mwai Kibaki. One of NARC’s most important
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commitments, together with the replacement of Kenya’s  indepen-
dence constitution, was to ﬁght corruption (Branch et al. ; Wrong
). In particular the new government undertook to investigate and
ensure the recovery of all public lands illegally allocated by the outgoing
government (Kibaki ). In exercise of the powers conferred on the
president by Section  of the Commissions of Inquiry Act , a
Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal and Irregular Allocation of Public
Land chaired by the lawyer Paul Ndung’u was appointed to investigate
this issue. The commission’s report (RoK , hereafter ‘the Ndung’u
report’) was presented to President Kibaki in December , and
released six months later only after widespread accusations of govern-
ment censorship in failing to make it public (Africog : ). The
-page report, supported by two annexes of  and  pages, sets
out in forensic detail the illegal land awards made over the years to the
families of Presidents Kenyatta and Moi, numerous former ministers,
members of parliament and civil servants, as well as to individuals in
the military and the judiciary. Despite the detail provided in the
annexes, it is admitted that the report is incomplete because of the lack
of cooperation with which the commission met (Ndung’u  int.;
Africog ). It provides a snapshot of only a proportion of the
illegal/irregular land allocations that have taken place (Aronson 
int.; Lamba  int.) The report recommended that a large majority of
land titles acquired in this way should be revoked and recommended the
rectiﬁcation of others (RoK : –).
Although it has been widely discussed in the Kenyan media and its
ﬁndings taken up by leading human rights groups (see Africog ;
KNCHR & KLA ), the Ndung’u report has received less academic
attention than it deserves (but see Boone ; Kanyinga ; Klopp
; Southall ). In addition, although the economic and social
costs of widespread land corruption are likely to be far higher than the
overall costs of better-known corruption scandals such as Anglo-Leasing
and Goldenburg (Aronson  int.; Wanguhu  int.), the ﬁndings
of the Ndung’u report have not been systematically studied by academic
or other commentators. Discussions of the report have tended to focus
on its ‘juicy ﬁndings’ (Southall : ), the ‘what’ and ‘whom’ of
illegal or irregular land allocation – the forests, road reservations,
school playgrounds and graveyards that have been misallocated and
the individuals and families who acquired them (so far as this can be
ascertained) – rather than the ‘how’ of land grabbing. Nonetheless, the
report provides detailed information about the mechanisms by which
public land was misallocated and the means by which the doctrine that
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public land should be administered and allocated ‘in the public interest’
(RoK : –) was consistently perverted. This has been recognised
by Southall (: ), who noted that ‘it is the chapter and verse
which the Report gives concerning the systematic way in which
established procedures, designed to protect the public interest, were
perverted to serve private and political ends which may well prove to be
its most long lasting value’.
However, one of the most signiﬁcant issues raised by the Ndung’u
commission – the extent to which illegal or irregular transactions in
public land in Kenya have been made possible through administrative
and professional corruption – has been largely neglected. In his
short assessment of the Ndung’u report, Southall (: ) remarked
that the ‘extensive complicity of professionals (lawyers, surveyors,
valuers, physical planners, engineers, architects, land registrars, estate
agents and bankers) in the land and property market was key to the
process of land grabbing’, but did not explore the point in any detail.
The Ndung’u commission, ﬁnding that ‘public land has been allocated
contrary to the substantive and procedural provisions of the relevant
laws’ (RoK : ), made three recommendations: that investigations
be conducted and, if necessary, prosecutions brought against pro-
fessionals involved in facilitating illegal or irregular allocation of
public land; that professional bodies take disciplinary action under
their Codes of Conduct; and that the government recover all money
and other proceeds acquired as a result of professionals’ involvement
(Recommendations –, RoK : –). In so doing, the Ndung’u
commission went further than the earlier Commission of Inquiry into
the Land Law Systems of Kenya  (RoK , known as the ‘Njonjo
commission’ after its chairperson) which strongly condemned pro-
fessions for their role in the irregular allocation of public land
(Mwathane ), but had to stop short of recommending disciplinary
action because this was outside its terms of reference (Ndung’u 
int.). To date, despite the report’s recommendations, no investigations
of professionals’ involvement in land corruption have been initiated
(ibid.). Nor has legal or disciplinary action been taken by the police or by
the Law Society of Kenya against lawyers involved in land grabbing
(Lamba  int.).
Arguably the most important contribution of the Ndung’u report has
been to set out the detailed mechanisms by which public land was
illegally or irregularly allocated not for the purposes of development
but as political reward (see also Hunt ; Kanyinga ; Klopp ;
Olima ; Onoma ). Importantly for our understanding of
L A W Y E R S , P O L I T I C S A N D P U B L I C L A N D I N K E N Y A
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Kenya’s fraught electoral history (Anderson ; Throup & Hornsby
), the Commission found that illegal allocations of public land
escalated signiﬁcantly before or soon after the multiparty general
elections of ,  and , evidence that public land was
allocated ‘as political reward or patronage’ (RoK : ). For Southall
(: ), ‘even a cursory analysis serves to conﬁrm earlier analyses
that corruption and patronage have become thoroughly embedded in
Kenya’s politics’. This is a critical issue as Kenya prepares for general
elections in . Recent press reports suggest that illegal and irregular
allocation of public land to raise electoral ﬁnance and to shore up
political support, as well as to consolidate personal gain before losing
ofﬁce, is indeed taking place in preparation for the coming contest (The
Standard ..; The Star ..). Politicians continue to use
public ofﬁce to identify proﬁtable land to be grabbed, and sell land they
have grabbed in the past.
This paper ﬁrst explores what the Ndung’u report tells us
about the role of the legal profession in Kenya in the illegal and
irregular misallocation of public land. The venality of the political
and business elite has long been the focus of academic writing
concerned with the nature and working of the African state (Bayart
). It is less common to ﬁnd accounts of corruption amongst
bureaucrats, administrators and professionals (Budlender ; Ghai &
Cottrell ). The Ndung’u report is of particular interest in this
regard. It makes clear that the legal profession, far from upholding
the rule of law (Carothers ; Harrington & Manji ), has
played a key role in land corruption in Kenya, using its professional
skills and networks to accumulate personal wealth for itself and
others. The report’s ﬁndings on the complicity of professionals in
land grabbing have important implications for our understanding
of lawyers and lawyering in Kenya (Ghai ). Today, the centrality
of the legal profession to the promotion of good governance and
the rule of law is widely asserted in academic literature and by
policy makers (see Carothers ; Faundez ; McAuslan ).
‘Rule of law training’, including the training of judges and magistrates,
is now supported by signiﬁcant international development aid
(DfID ; Manji ). However, the failure of the Kenyan legal
profession to take seriously the Ndung’u report’s ﬁndings on its own
participation in graft should give us pause about international
programmes to promote the rule of law and good governance. In
addition, I argue that the Law Society of Kenya’s (LSK) recent efforts
to ally itself with the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) in
 A M B R E E N A M A N J I
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campaigning against graft at the Ministry of Lands and Settlements
(Daily Nation ..) should be treated with scepticism, given its long-
running failure to confront the complicity of some of its members in
land corruption.
By attending to the phenomenon of ‘local’ land grabbing, this paper
aims, secondly, to add to our understanding of land governance. Access
to land was at the root of anti-colonial struggles in Kenya (Anderson
; Furedi ) and continues to be a signiﬁcant source of conﬂict
(Branch et al. ; Cheeseman ; Lynch ; Mueller ).
I argue that the recent focus on the phenomenon of the ‘global land
grab’ (Zagema ) or ‘investor rush’ (Hall ) takes place at the
expense of understanding the role of in-country, local land grabbing,
leading to simplistic analyses of Africa’s land problems. Indeed Ruth
Hall (ibid.) has recently questioned the usefulness of the term ‘land
grabbing’, arguing that whilst it is helpful to activists framing land claims
and ﬁghting land deals made over a resource that is treated as both
plentiful and idle, the phrase is of little academic merit because it
obscures the intricacies of land deals and the complexity of the ways in
which they are structured (see also Borras & Franco ; Bush et al.
). Whilst wishing to retain the term ‘land grabbing’ for its power to
draw attention to the widespread dispossession entailed in the practice,
I show that richer understandings of the metaphor can be reached by
attending to local manifestations of land privatisation. By exploring in-
country land grabbing by Kenya’s own elite, this paper aims to add to
our understanding of struggles over land and the varied contexts in
which they take place.
T H E F I N D I N G S O F T H E N D U N G ’ U C O M M I S S I O N O N
I L L E G A L / I R R E G U L A R L A N D A L L O C A T I O N
According to the African Centre for Global Governance (Africog :
), the Ndung’u report established that ‘illegal allocation of public
land is one of the most pronounced manifestations of corruption and
political patronage in our society’. On a conservative estimate, some
, illegal titles were created between  and . Of these,
% were issued between  and . The categories of public
land affected include forests, settlement schemes, national parks
and game reserves, civil service houses, government ofﬁces, roads
and road reserves, wetlands, research farms, state corporation lands
and trust lands. The report makes it clear that the illegal allocations
took place either on the direct orders of the president or on the
L A W Y E R S , P O L I T I C S A N D P U B L I C L A N D I N K E N Y A
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orders of prominent senior public ofﬁcials and well-connected
business people and politicians. Those who beneﬁted from the
illegal or irregular allocations of grabbed land included ministers,
senior civil servants, politicians, business people, churches, temples
and mosques.
The report distinguishes between the illegal and the irregular
allocation of public land (RoK : –). The ﬁrst category of
wrongful allocation, when land is illegally issued, occurs when the legal
safeguards governing the allocation of land are ignored or subverted.
For instance, where a title is issued for a piece of land which is not
legally available for allocation, the title acquired is illegal. The report
recommended that such titles should be revoked and stipulated that in
certain instances, such as where the land had been sold on to a third
party or is being held by a bank as security for a loan, decisions as to
revocation should be made on a case-by-case basis by a Land Title
Tribunal using clear criteria such as the number and classes of people
ﬁnancially affected and ‘the public interest’. (The role of a Land Titles
Tribunal is discussed below.)
The second category of wrongful allocation is irregular allocation
of land. According to the Ndung’u report (RoK : –), this
occurred when administrative procedures for dealing in land were
not followed. Here, the land concerned was legally available for
allocation, but the requisite legal standard was not met or the correct
administrative procedure followed. For this second category of cases,
the report recommended that irregular titles be rectiﬁed by following
the administrative procedures that had been bypassed.
The Ndung’u report provides exhaustive details of the processes by
which the wrongful allocation of public land was achieved. Although
these processes have not been the subject of academic commentary or
analysis to date (except Southall ), they are likely to make a lasting
contribution to our understanding of how land law in Kenya has been
subverted (and therefore potentially of how such laws might be
reformed). According to the report (RoK : ), the abuse of the
powers of allocation was central to the plundering of public land. It is
therefore necessary to understand the allocation process. In order to do
so, the report identiﬁed three categories of land in Kenya. The ﬁrst was
government land, which included both alienated land (that is, land
which had been leased to a private individual or company or reserved
for use by a government department or corporation or institution, or
which has been set aside for another public purpose), and unalienated
land (that is, land that had not yet been leased or allocated).
 A M B R E E N A M A N J I
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Second, trust land which was held by County Councils on behalf of
local communities under African Customary Law. Once such land was
registered according to any of the land registration statutes, it became
private land and was then regarded as the sole property of the individual
or group in whose name it is registered (RoK : ). Third, land
which was registered in accordance with the land registration statutes
in the name of an individual or a company was deemed to be private
land. This category of land could be created from either government
or trust land through registration after certain procedures had been
adhered to (RoK : –; Southall ). The Ndung’u commission
investigated the illegal and irregular allocation of government land and,
when cases came to its notice, of trust land affected by fraudulent
practices. Taken together, government land and some trust land made
up the category of ‘public land’ into which the Ndung’u commission
inquired.
According to the commission’s ﬁndings, it was the very individuals
entrusted with being custodians of public land who were involved in
‘pilfering the public’ (Klopp ). They did so by subverting or
ignoring the legal safeguards in place to protect public land (RoK
: ). Thus, although the president has the right to allocate
unalienated government lands (and can delegate limited powers to the
Commissioner of Lands), he could not exercise his powers without
taking into account the public interest. The report describes how in
practice the Commissioner of Lands and his ofﬁcials were given
responsibility for public land: under the Government Lands Act 
they could allow township plots on unalienated land to be sold by
auction if not required for public purposes. However, neither the
president nor the Commissioner of Lands has the authority to allocate
alienated government land, that is, land that has been earmarked for a
public purpose (such as road reservations) (RoK : ).
As well as subjecting the president and the Commissioner of Lands to
these legal safeguards, the law also controlled the process of allocation
itself. A formal offer of sale had to be made to an approved purchaser
by the Commissioner for Lands. Known as a letter of allotment,
this was only made to the person to whom it was addressed, lapsed
after thirty days, and had conditions attached. Signiﬁcantly, a letter of
allotment cannot be legally transferred to another person (RoK :
) (the use of letters of allotment is explored in greater detail below).
Similarly, land categorised as trust land could only be removed from
the communal ownership of local people by a process of adjudication
in which local communities are given adequate notice and the
L A W Y E R S , P O L I T I C S A N D P U B L I C L A N D I N K E N Y A
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opportunity to claim their ownership in accordance with customary law
(ibid.: ).
The commission investigated the illegal allocation of different types of
land, including urban land, ministry land, national parks and museums,
to mention a few. To take urban land as an illustration, the commission
found evidence of widespread abuse of presidential discretion with
regard to unalienated urban land. Both Presidents Kenyatta and Moi
were found to have made grants to individuals without any reference to
the public interest. The allocation was therefore done without following
the correct legal procedure (Ndung’u  int.). Furthermore, both
presidents also allocated alienated land despite the fact that this is not a
category of land which they have any legal power to allocate. The
Ndung’u report also found that a number of Commissioners of Lands
had made direct grants of government land without any authority from
the president. Often, land was quickly sold by grantees at very high
prices to third parties without any adherence to the conditions laid
down by letters of allotment, and despite the fact that such letters only
have the status of letters of offer and cannot be sold (Aronson  int.;
RoK : ). Far from being restrained by the principle of public
purpose, the Commissioner of Lands and many local authorities
completely disregarded it, and sold land reserved exclusively for public
purposes such as schools, playgrounds and hospitals. Forged letters and
documents were commonly used to allocate land. Records at the
Ministry of Lands and Settlements were found to have been deliberately
destroyed (RoK : ).
The report also provides critical details of developments in the
aftermath of illegal or irregular land allocations. It showed how
those allocated land would move quickly to sell it, in many cases, to
state corporations at hugely inﬂated prices. State corporations were in
effect exploited as coerced buyers of grabbed land. Pressurised into
making illegal purchases of public land, they become ‘captive buyers of
land from politically connected allottees’ (RoK: ). As the report
makes clear, there is a further injustice in the fact that state corporations
had sometimes also been the victims and not just the conduits of land
grabbing. They could ‘lose their land to grabbers for free, and then
be pressured to buy other lands for millions of shillings’ (Ndung’u
: ). The primary state corporation targeted to purchase land was
the Kenyan workers’ pension scheme, the National Social Security Fund
(NSSF). It spent about Ksh billion (about US$ million) between
 and  on the purchase of illegally acquired property. The NSSF
was set up in  and is regulated by the Minister for Labour, to whom
 A M B R E E N A M A N J I
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a tripartite Advisory Council gives advice and assistance in
connection with the implementation of the National Social Security
Fund Act  (Mullei : ). This legislation stipulates that the
purpose of the NSSF is to provide for contributions to the payment of
beneﬁts out of the Fund and to provide ‘some form of social protection’
(ibid.) against old age, death and incapacitating physical or mental
disability. Instead, the Ndung’u commission found that the NSSF
and other state corporations were simply abused as a vehicle for off-
loading grabbed land: ‘State corporations were used as conduits for land
grabbing schemes through which the public lost colossal amounts of
money’ (RoK : ). For example, the Ndung’u report found that
a former chairman of the Cooperative Bank of Kenya was illegally
allocated land in Ngong Forest which he then sold on to the NSSF (ibid.,
Annexe : ).
The human and social costs to the country of this plundering of
the NSSF – ‘diverting resources away from public use’ (KNCHR &
KLA : ) – have not been quantiﬁed. However, the NSSF continues
to suffer losses even in the present day. As recently as September
, the auditors of the NSSF noted that the corporation’s legal bills
were in excess of Kshmillion (approximately $US,), and were
critical of the fact that signiﬁcant amounts of money had been paid in
legal fees (amounting to Ksh million) that had not been approved
by its board (Daily Nation ..). Most of the legal costs incurred
involve disputes about the status of land that the NSSF still holds on its
books. Long after the NSSF was used as a coerced buyer of land, it
continues to lose money relating to activities outside its core remit to
provide social security payments to Kenyans. The assets of the NSSF
may also be overvalued as a result of its holding grabbed land, making it
difﬁcult to assess its ﬁnancial health (Cottrell  int.).
More broadly, the likely economic and social costs of widespread
land corruption will be borne for many years to come. The misallocation
of public land instigates a process by which land that should be
available for the public good – for the building of medical clinics and
schools, for public parks and public transport facilities such as
railways – is transformed into private land. This privatisation deprives
the public of signiﬁcant social goods whilst generating large proﬁts for
the private consumption of well-connected individuals and families. Two
examples of this process can be given. In one prominent case, a
questionable change of use enabled  acres of land in a suburb of
Nairobi that had been reserved to build two state schools to be sold to a
diplomatic mission (Aronson  int.; see more generally RoK :
L A W Y E R S , P O L I T I C S A N D P U B L I C L A N D I N K E N Y A
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). The schools were never built on this or any other site. In another
case, land reserved for the development of a public medical clinic and
day nursery was, again through a questionable change of use, instead
given over to the building of a shopping centre in an exclusive suburb of
Nairobi (Cottrell  int.; The Star ..) (see below for an account
of how changes of use were achieved).
T H E R O L E O F T H E L E G A L P R O F E S S I O N
The work of human rights lawyers in exposing abuse and
opposing repression in Kenya has been well documented (Adar &
Munyae : ; Mwangi ; Ross ; Throup & Hornsby ;
Widner ). Lawyers are widely perceived as having spearheaded the
democratisation movement (Kagwanja : ). Indeed, Kenya has
recently appointed one such lawyer, Dr Willy Mutunga, as its new Chief
Justice (Daily Nation ..). Conversely, the role of the legal
profession in bolstering authoritarian rule in Kenya has also been widely
discussed (see Mwangi ). However, away from the human rights
and civil liberties spheres, the work of the legal profession since
independence has rarely been the subject of detailed study (but see
Ghai , ). The Ndung’u report provides important information
about lawyers’ centrality to the plunder of public land. Although the
precise role played by lawyers was outside its terms of reference, it is
alluded to throughout the report, enabling us to develop an account of
how the illegal or irregular allocation of public land was achieved,
usually under lawyers’ professional guidance and with their collabor-
ation.
The involvement of lawyers in land corruption can be categorised as
having occurred either through omission or by commission (Lumumba
 int.). Lawyers often failed to advise their clients that the land
transaction before them could not proceed because, for example, the
land in question was not properly available for allocation (resulting in an
illegal acquisition), or because correct administrative procedures had
not been followed, for example where forest land was excised without
have been properly gazetted (leading to an irregular allocation). At a
minimum, by failing to deter their clients from becoming involved in
improper land transactions lawyers failed in their professional duties of
care (Dugdale & Stanton ).
The Ndung’u report also identiﬁed numerous instances in which
lawyers actively assisted in the commission of fraud and knowingly
abetted illegalities and irregularities (Lumumba  int.). There are
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at least ﬁve important ways in which lawyers used their professional
skills actively to facilitate land corruption. First, their detailed knowledge
of, and extensive networks within, the infamously chaotic Ministry of
Lands and Settlement enabled them to identify suitable plots of public
land to be targeted for illegal allocation. Second, with the help of lawyers
familiar with Kenyan company law, those involved in land corruption
were able to ensure that their identities were carefully concealed.
The two annexes to the Ndung’u report are ﬁlled with the names of
companies clearly set up in order to shield the names of those involved
in land grabbing from public scrutiny. Third, lawyers oversaw and
encouraged a thriving market in letters of allotment which came to be
treated as tradable land documents, although lawyers knew they did not
have this status in law. Fourth, members of the legal profession used
their networks in the Ministry of Lands and Settlement improperly
to acquire changes of use that allowed land that had been reserved
for public purposes such as schools and medical clinics, and most
commonly for roads, to be sold for residential or commercial
use. Finally, lawyers often advised clients how to regularise land scams
after the event. These ﬁve aspects of lawyers’ work will be discussed
in turn.
The Ministry of Lands and Settlement is widely known as one
of Kenya’s most inefﬁciently run public services. It is cited in
Transparency International’s Bribery Index  (TI ) as Kenya’s
ﬁfth most corrupt institution after the police, the Ministry of Defence,
Nairobi City Council and the Immigration Department. The Ndung’u
commission found that one of the main reasons for the illegal allocation
of public land was the ‘chaotic record keeping system’ in the Ministry
and in the district registries (RoK : ). In addition, it found
that records were falsiﬁed or hidden in order to conceal the illegal
allocation of land (ibid.: ). In such an environment, the skills of
lawyers accustomed to navigating their way through disorganised land
records were invaluable (Mwathane  int.). Lawyers also forged close
links with surveyors in the Ministry (Aronson  int.; Mwathane 
int.). Their involvement was important. The Ndung’u report found
that surveyors employed by the Ministry would survey a piece of land
‘from their desk’ without ever visiting the site (RoK : ), and
subsequently issue two title deeds to the same parcel of land, one
under the Registered Land Act , for example, and one under the
Registration of Titles Act : ‘as part of an elaborate scheme of land
grabbing and given the multiplicity of land registration laws, different
titles would be issued to the same piece of land . . . The double issuance
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of titles was meant to facilitate the illegal allocation of public land’ (RoK
: ). By enabling land to be dealt with under two systems
simultaneously, a mechanism was created by which extensive land
grabbing took place (Mwathane  int.).
Second, lawyers used company law to assist in concealing the identity
of land grabbers. The report sets out how the commissioners
encountered severe difﬁculties in trying to ascertain the names of
individuals involved in illegal or irregular land acquisition during
searches carried out at the Registry of Companies (RoK : ):
The Commission discovered quite early in its work that many illegal
allocations of public land were made not to individuals but companies.
These companies were ostensibly registered at the Registry of Companies in
conformity with the requirements of the Companies Act, Cap  of the
Laws of Kenya. The Commission would not have fulﬁlled one of its Terms of
Reference if it did not disclose the names of the people (either directors or
share holders) behind these companies. This meant that in many instances,
a single title of land required a double search at the Ministry of Lands and at
the Registry of Companies.
Despite the cooperation of the Registrar of Companies, the commission
encountered problems in identifying the individuals behind companies
that had been allocated land. In some cases, the companies holding
allocated land did not exist in law. In these cases, individuals had
acquired blank Certiﬁcate of Incorporation forms which they submitted
to acquire public land but which were not ﬁled or reﬂected in the
records of the Companies Register. In others, companies that had not
been fully incorporated acquired land. The Ndung’u report shows that
most high-proﬁle allocations of public land were made to companies
incorporated speciﬁcally for that purpose, largely to shield the directors
and shareholders of such entities from easy public view (RoK : ).
Company law was carefully used to achieve this. The commission gives a
list of companies which acquired land but whose individual owners are
not immediately evident (ibid., Annexe I: –).
The third questionable practice overseen by lawyers was the
improper use of letters of allotment. Letters of allotment were widely
used as land titles and changed hands quickly in sales of grabbed land,
despite the fact that they cannot be properly used for this purpose.
These documents confer no transferable interest or rights over land in
favour of the person to whom they are addressed. Strictly, they only
enable land to be allocated so long as the exact conditions set out on
the face of the document are adhered to. These specify that the offer
to allocate land is made only to the person named in the letter of
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allotment, that it expires after thirty days, and that the land
allocated must be developed within a given period. Despite the fact
that letters of allotment cannot function as titles, the Ndung’u
commission found that lawyers widely failed to advise their clients of
this, either in pursuit of the legal fees earned, in order not to threaten
their retainer, or because they themselves took a proportion of the
proceeds of sale from allotted land (Aronson  int.). Lawyers actively
participated in the abuse of letters of allotment by presiding over the
transformation from letters of offer into land instruments to be
transacted (Lumumba  int.).
The fourth and most widespread practice involved changes of use.
Legal professionals abetted improper changes of use that enabled land
reserved for public purposes to be privatised and developed or sold for
large proﬁts. In practice, this amounts to an illegal allocation of land
reserved for public purposes by the Commissioner of Lands ‘in total
disregard of the law and the public interest for which they had been
reserved’ (RoK : ). These lands were allocated following the
submission of Part Development Plans prepared by lawyers and
surveyors to the Commissioner of Lands, who then issued consents for
changes of use under the relevant law, such as the Physical Planning Act
 or the Forests Act . Land was often then swiftly sold on to
third parties by the original allottees. The most prominent category of
land allocated in this manner was land reserved for the future
development of roads. Changes of use enabled this category of land to
be grabbed throughout the country. In Nairobi, the City Council
approved development plans for areas that were clearly set aside for
construction of roads. According to the report, it was not unusual for the
commission to see a development plan for a residence being prepared
for land that was supposed to be reserved for a road (ibid.: ). In
addition, ofﬁcials in the Ministry of Roads, Public Works and Housing
and the Nairobi City Council regularly wrote letters of no objection to
problematic proposed developments (ibid.: ). However the report
notes that neither the approval for change of use given by the
Commissioner of Lands, nor the letters expressing no objection could
properly result in valid changes of use. As a result, allocations acquired
in this way are not legal (see Annexe  Chapter  for a list of affected
road reserves).
It is difﬁcult to state with certainty how many lawyers were involved
in illegal and irregular allocations of land in the ways set out above.
Whilst many Kenyan lawyers participated in the struggle for democratic
rights (Mutua : ), it is clear that a signiﬁcant number of
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them – both in private practice and public ofﬁcers such as land
registrars (Mwathane  int.) – were at the very least complicit in
land corruption (Ndung’u  int.) and in some cases made
themselves indispensable to its commission, reaping rich personal
reward and sometimes political ofﬁce as a result (Lumumba 
int.). For many prominent law ﬁrms it was the mainstay of their work
(Lumumba  int.). This is suggested by the report’s estimate that
over , illegal land titles have been created since independence,
a ﬁgure widely thought to underestimate the scale of the problem
(Mwathane  int.; Ndung’u  int.). So many titles could not have
been created without the professional services rendered by lawyers
working closely with other professionals, notably surveyors, with whom
they shared ‘an incestuous relationship’ (Mwathane  int.), and
valuers.
Despite the scale of the problem, the complicity of lawyers in the
illegal or irregular allocation of land in the ways set out above has been
largely overlooked. Indeed, the Law Society of Kenya has recently played
a prominent role in campaigning against corruption at the Ministry of
Lands and Settlement, joining hands with the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission in a high-proﬁle demonstration outside the Ministry
demanding that corrupt lands ofﬁcials be named and prosecuted (The
Standard ..). There is blatant bad faith by the legal profession in
choosing to ignore the conduct of its members in ‘solemnising’ land
corruption (Capital FM ..).
The Law Society of Kenya’s objectives, as enshrined in its
constitution, are to maintain and promote the rule of law in Kenya by
ensuring that an independent and efﬁcient legal profession serves
the people of Kenya (Law Society of Kenya ). In asserting this,
the Law Society is echoing the language of international rule of law
programmes which hold legal professionals to be a bulwark against
rule of law failures, and central to the promotion of good governance
in the third world (World Justice Project ). However, the
involvement of lawyers in land grabbing in the post-colonial era, and
their failure to confront the extent of the profession’s complicity in
graft, call into doubt the policy attention and funding being directed to
rule-of-law training. International programmes to promote the rule of
law present the legal profession as standing apart from the murky
business of day-to-day politics as custodians of good governance. Rule of
law programmes function through a strict distinction between profes-
sionalism and politics. The Kenyan experience of lawyers’ role in land
corruption casts doubt on this distinction. Lawyers and politics have
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been intricately and dangerously connected for personal, political and
electoral gain.
I M P L E M E N T I N G T H E N D U N G ’ U R E P O R T
The Ndung’u report was met with enormous interest by the media and
by civil society on its release in July . For many, it conﬁrmed much
that had been known about land crimes and constituted an ofﬁcial
record of widespread dispossession. Amidst rumours that the report had
been doctored before its release to protect the names of prominent
individuals (The Standard ..), a claim denied by the commis-
sion’s chairperson (Daily Nation ..), the press reported
extensively on those who had been involved in land grabbing and the
land that they had acquired (ibid. ..).
Recognition of the difﬁculties of implementing the Ndung’u report’s
recommendations quickly followed the euphoria of its release. An early
attempt to force implementation through the courts came in  in
the case of Mureithi v Attorney General (Kenya Law Reports ). The
applicants, the Mbari ya Murathimi clan from Nyeri, brought an action
for judicial review, arguing that the recommendations of the Ngung’u
commission should be implemented in so far as they related to their
land. They applied for orders of mandamus against the Attorney-
General, the Minister for Lands and Settlement, the Commissioner for
Lands, the Nyeri District Land Registrar, the Catholic Archdiocese of
Nyeri and the Archbishop to implement the recommendations of the
Ndung’u report in so far as it touched on Land Parcels LR , 
Nyeri Municipality. The report identiﬁed the land as having been
illegally acquired and recommended revocation of title. Rejecting the
request, the Nairobi High Court agreed with the respondents that it was
not under a statutory duty to implement the recommendations. Nyamu
J. pointed out that it is a fundamental weakness of the Commission of
Inquiry Act  that once the president is presented with the report of
a commission he has complete discretion on further action and is not
under any obligation to respond to the ﬁndings. In dismissing the
application, the court held that it is not its role but that of the executive
and parliament to implement policy. As well as defeating an early
attempt to implement the Ndung’u report, this ﬁnding has important
implications for the ﬁndings of future commissions of inquiry (Africog
; see more generally Ashforth ).
Given the period over which the illegal allocation of public
land had taken place, many of the land titles investigated by the
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Ndung’u commission were held by third parties who were not
involved in the original transactions, many of whom had not
committed any legal wrong: they might have been offered and bought
the land from the original allottee, been offered the title to land as
security for a loan, have inherited the land from a deceased friend or
relative, or received it as a gift. When considering the legal position of
third parties the commission argued that such rights are extinguished
since they were illegal from their inception. Third parties could be
interpreted as being in the same position as the original allottee.
However, it recognised the difﬁculties entailed in dealing with third
parties who had acted innocently in acquiring land interests. They noted
in particular the potential hardships endured by third parties who had
made substantial developments, by state corporations which were
coerced into buying land, and commercial lenders who had acquired
the titles as security against loans. Although it was generally rec-
ommended that illegally issued titles that had been passed on to third
parties should be revoked and the land repossessed, the commission
recognised that where the land had been developed ‘consideration
should be given to all the circumstances of the case including
the cost incurred in developing the land’, the number of people
involved ﬁnancially, the economic value and the public interest (Africog
: ).
The difﬁcult questions raised by the widespread presence of
illegally and irregularly held titles in Kenya are unlikely to be resolved
for many years (Ndung’u  int.). Following the release of the
Ndung’u report, the KACC, itself mired in political difﬁculties (The
Standard ..), has engaged in sporadic and high-proﬁle reposses-
sions of land, taking an approach very different from that recommended
by Ndung’u: that a Land Titles Tribunal be created systematically and
transparently to review land titles (RoK : ; Lamba  int.).
Indeed, the sporadic repossession of grabbed land has arguably
distracted attention from the problems that continue to characterise
the Ministry of Lands and Settlement (Ndung’u  int.). Here the
same administrators who facilitated years of land grabbing remain in
ofﬁce (Mwathane  int.). Recently, following demonstrations by
civil society groups such as the Kenya Non-State Actors Alliance, the
Permanent Secretary in the ministry has undertaken to deal with
corruption in it, and to prosecute corrupt ofﬁcials (Standard ..;
Lumumba  int.). This leaves the very individuals known to have
collaborated in land grabbing in charge of dealing with corruption
(Mwathane  int.).
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Fundamental to the problems rehearsed in the Ndung’u report is
the fact that the administration of land is intricately tied up with politics
rather than sheltered from political interference (Lumumba 
int.; Ndung’u  int.). The Njonjo commission sought to address
this critical issue in  when it recommended the creation of an
independent National Land Commission (NLC). This recommen-
dation, which would have stemmed the land grabbing reported by the
Ndung’u commission, was never acted upon and was restated in the
Ndung’u report (Aronson  int.). A National Land Commission Bill
 was given its ﬁrst reading in parliament on  February . The
bill which, together with the Land Bill  and the Land Registration
Bill , is constitutionally mandated (RoK , Chapter ), is widely
agreed to be poorly drafted and to fail to address the land issues
facing Kenya. As a result of pressure from civil society groups, on
 February parliament voted by the required two-thirds majority (ibid.,
Article ()) to extend the constitutional deadline of eighteen
months for approval of the legislation (Fifth Schedule, RoK ), to
allow for wider consultation and for thorough redrafting. Fresh drafts
were expected at the time of writing. The failure of the drafts of the
National Land Commission Bill seen so far explicitly to distribute powers
of land allocation and management between the NLC and the Ministry
of Lands and Settlement is a major concern (see Kituo cha Sheria et al.
). It constitutes an important sign of the difﬁculties of wresting
control over land from those long accustomed to using it as a ‘patronage
resource’ (Klopp : ; Ndung’u  int.). Problems at the Ministry
of Lands and Settlement include on-going corruption of its ofﬁcials, the
forging of titles, and the presence in ﬁles of invalid documents such as
letters of allotment that have been treated as titles (Mwathane 
int.). These cannot be resolved simply by taking remedial actions such as
funding the computerisation of land records, a process that is almost
complete in Uganda and has been widely mooted in Kenya (Daily Nation
..), ‘the computerisation of corruption’ as one commentator
described it (Capital FM ..). As Kenya reviews the legal
framework governing land, the test to be applied should be whether
the proposed changes would have prevented the illegal and irregular
allocations of public land on the vast scale identiﬁed by the Ndung’u
commission.
Two unintended outcomes of the Ndung’u report demonstrate that,
despite the failure to implement its ﬁndings, it is of on-going political
and economic relevance. First, the report has emerged as an important
source of information during the vetting processes for public ofﬁce
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underway in Kenya since the inauguration of the new constitution
in . Two examples of the way in which the report has recently
been cited illustrate its on-going relevance. During the vetting of the
prospective Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Keriako Tobiko, by
the Constitution Implementation Oversight Committee, his failure to
prosecute individuals involved in land grabbingwas raised (KHRC ).
Despite protestations, Tobiko was conﬁrmed as DPP on  June 
and, signiﬁcantly for this paper, is widely expected to continue his
previous stance of taking no action in relation to the Ndung’u report.
The question of complicity in land grabbing as recorded by the Ndung’u
commission was also raised against Bethuel Kiplagat, the chairman of
Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). Kiplagat
was cited in the Ndung’u report as having acquired a number of
government houses through illegal or irregular land awards (Africa
Conﬁdential ). References to the Ndung’u report in the process of
assessing suitability for public ofﬁce demonstrates that the commission’s
ﬁndings continue to be relevant to Kenyan politics, although their use in
vetting candidates could not have been foreseen by the commissioners
(Lamba  int.).
Second, as well as functioning today as a detailed ofﬁcial record of
the elaborate practices of land grabbing that have taken place in Kenya,
the Ndung’u report has also become an important source of legal
information on affected parcels of land. If the ﬁndings of the Ndung’u
commission remain unheeded by the political system, they have been
enthusiastically taken up by the ﬁnancial and legal systems: bankers and
lawyers regularly refer to the report to ascertain if particular parcels of
land have appeared in it, for example as being recommended for title
revocation (Wanguhu  int.; Ubhi  int.).
Since the publication of the Ndung’u report, it has become clear
that undoing many years of illegal and irregular allocations of land will
be both complex and costly. The commission itself cost Ksh,,
(US$,), and subsequent work by the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission on land issues (including investigating cases, issuing
revocation orders and bringing legal actions) has not been quantiﬁed.
As well as the vast expense incurred in unravelling the mess in which
Kenya’s land system ﬁnds itself, the complex legal problems thrown up
by Ndung’u commission’s ﬁndings may mean that the recommen-
dations for correcting the injustices of land grabbing will never be
thoroughly implemented. In addition to widespread cynicism amongst
members of the public about the ‘eating’ of land (Harrington & Manji
), there has also been a critical effect on the economy and on
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politics (Berry ) from the lack of certainty in land matters (SID
).
T H E G R A B B E D S T A T E
In a paper published before Kenya’s change of government in
 and the commissioning of the Ndung’u report, Klopp (: )
provided a perceptive account of the ‘pilfering’ of public land, focusing
on the s and the illegal allocations of public land that took place
under the Moi regime. Her account of ‘the irregular privatisation of
public land’ remains one of the few academic analyses to take seriously
local or internal land grabbing. Of course, the extent and details of
land grabbing were widely known amongst members of the public
and civil society groups (Lamba  int.). Many communities
became victims of the predatory actions of land grabbers (Klopp
), and the land grabbing stories that regularly circulated in Kenya
ensured that few people were ignorant of the scale of misallocation of
public land. Indeed, a number of organisations vigorously resisted
land grabbing, including through the courts, notably Kituo cha Sheria
(Centre for Justice) (Weru  int.). In October , at the height
of attempted land grabbing in Karura Forest, the Architectural
Association of Kenya announced that it would take disciplinary action
against any member found to be working with improperly acquired
properties (Githongo ). Much of the analysis presented by
Klopp is conﬁrmed by the Ndung’u commission. Klopp (: )
argued that as Kenya’s powerful political elite confronted the reality of
declining ‘patronage resources’, it sought alternative ways to ﬁnance
its patrimonial control. She sees the growth in the illegal allocation of
public land of the s as a ‘creative counter-strategy to change’
(ibid.). These threats to patronage resources included the decline in
aid as a source of patronage, the greater scrutiny of some forms of
corruption by the international community and, in the context of
the introduction of multi-party elections, the increased political
contests they faced (ibid.: ). Public land, less visible to international
donors and therefore escaping their scrutiny, was transformed into a
valuable ‘patronage asset’ (ibid.). Kenya’s ‘land grabbing mania’ is for
Klopp an unintended consequence of donors’ periodic withdrawals of
aid in the s. The accuracy of this claim has subsequently been
conﬁrmed by the Ngung’u commission’s ﬁnding that illegal and
irregular allocations of land peaked at election times (RoK : ;
Southall : ).
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Klopp also argues that with the increased competition entailed in the
liberalisation of the political system, administrative ofﬁcials feared for
the continued access to land that they exercised, and sought quickly to
maximise the rent they extracted from its (mis)allocation, as well as
adding to their personal stocks of land resources. Key to this was the
allocation of land to property developers. For Klopp (: ), ‘the
intensiﬁcation of irregular allocations of public land to well-connected
individuals and land-buying companies . . . is a particularly revealing and
underscrutinised case of deepening corruption’ which, despite being
both widely discussed and resisted within Kenya, had ‘largely failed to
attract commensurate attention on the part of scholars’. Writers on
developments in Kenya’s political system in the s and subsequent
years privileged formal political practice over ‘informal manoeuvring’
(ibid.: ). Citing the work of NGOs including Kituo cha Sheria and the
KHRC Land Rights Programme in running Operation Firimbi (‘whistle’
in Kiswahili), which sought to document instances of land grabbing and
to organise local resistance to these actions (Lamba  int.), Klopp
(: ) argued that such work created a ‘realm of public scrutiny’.
Since Klopp’s paper, the Ndung’u report, by creating a permanent
ofﬁcial record of the phenomenon, has made a lasting contribution to
this scrutiny.
The term ‘land grabbing’ is now widely used in the media and in
academic writing, as well as by pressure groups. However, by far the
greatest attention is paid to grabbing carried out by private companies
and foreign buyers, intent on acquiring land as a way to guard against
future fuel and food shortages (Akam ). The term is therefore
associated primarily with the acquisition of land for the cultivation of
biofuels, sugar, rice and other foods such as in the Tana Delta (Borras
et al. ; Matondi et al. ). Much less attention has been paid
to what might be called, echoing recent formulations such as the
‘failed state’ (Bates ) and the ‘narco-state’ (Kohnert ), ‘the
grabbed state’. In this scenario, well-connected politicians, their families
and associates allocate state land to themselves in what amounts to
widespread in-country land grabbing by the state’s own nationals. As the
Ndung’u report shows, the local land grabbing which was inaugurated
by colonialism (Okoth-Ogendo ) and continues in the present
day, has a much longer history than the global land grabbing of foreign
investors (Cottrell  int.). Indeed, this process of ‘local land
grabbing’ is often intricately tied up with the more widely analysed
global process: public land illegally or irregularly allocated to individual
politicians, for example, may enable them to enter proﬁtable
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agreements with foreign investors, as recent legal action in the High
Court at Nyeri for recovery of land grabbed by President Moi from the
Samburu in Laikipia demonstrates (The Star ..). In addition,
widespread land grabbing and dispossession is sometimes associated
with failed states: on this analysis, Somalia is both a grabbed and a failed
state (Casanelli ; Cottrell  int.; De Waal ).
While some writers have recognised that governments have become
key actors in the global land grab, they have tended to view them
primarily as facilitators of land deals rather than as the principal party to
such actions: as German et al. (: ) put it:
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant disconnect between the portrayal of large-scale ‘land
grabs’ in the media, where the image of the greedy investor tends to be
invoked, and the active role of government in Mozambique, Tanzania and
Zambia in availing sizeable areas of land to investors. In each of these
countries investment promotion and lands agencies, and in several cases
local government, are amassing sizeable areas of land for transfer to the
public domain in the name of investment promotion for economic
development and poverty alleviation. In these countries, community
consultations are overwhelmingly mediated by government actors, often
with transactions that are not fully disclosed.
While this analysis recognises that a complex network of actors is
involved in land grabbing, it presents governments and individuals
within them as acting qua government: a well-known scenario entails
members of local government dispossessing local people of land behind
a thin veneer of consultation (Alden Wily ). I would go further than
this in describing the process of local land grabbing in Kenya: here, a
political elite has used its connections to acquire land and to amass huge
private wealth by dealing in this land, whether by developing, selling or
leasing it (Ghai ). They have acted in their individual rather than
their ofﬁcial capacities, although of course their political and economic
connections underpin their activities.
Writing recently of international land grabbing, Hall (: ) has
critiqued the language used to describe the phenomenon. She has
argued that ‘the popular term “land grabbing”, while effective as activist
terminology, obscures vast differences in the legality, structure and
outcomes of commercial land deals and deﬂects attention from the
roles of domestic elites and governments as partners, intermediaries
and beneﬁciaries’. Her response has been to develop a typology of land
grabbing, and to explore the ‘variegated and complex processes of
agrarian change, some of which reﬂect historical continuity, while
others may involve qualitative redirections in processes of agrarian
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change or the intensiﬁcation or speeding up of such processes – but may
also involve countervailing trends’ (ibid.: ). I share her concerns: that
an oversimpliﬁcation is taking place which obscures in particular the
local workings of land grabbing. I suggest that recent developments in
the governance of land grabbing, as evidenced by the World Bank’s
attempts to develop a code of conduct for land deals which asserts the
need, among other things, to respect existing land rights, the rule of law,
and environmental sustainability and not to jeopardise food security,
obscure the complex personal networks that undergird the practice.
What is eliminated by the metaphor of land grabbing is the role of
accomplices and the complex networks entailed in these transactions.
The term ‘land grabbing’ as currently deployed may prevent us from
thinking about the mechanisms by which the misallocation of public
land takes place, transforming land reserved for the public good into
private land. As the foregoing discussion shows, it is important to
investigate how professional knowledge and skills are used to pervert the
mechanisms of land law and administration.
: : :
More than six years after its publication, the Ndung’u report continues
to provide important insights into the politics of land in Kenya. Whilst
the ﬁndings of the Ndung’u commission and public awareness
campaigns such as Operation Firimbi may have made it more difﬁcult
to act with outright impunity over land, the failure to implement its
recommendations has ensured that land grabbing in Kenya continues to
take place. Undeterred by disciplinary or criminal action brought
against them, members of the legal profession continue to involve
themselves in illegal or irregular activities relating to public land. The
complex networks of personal and professional relationships that
underpin and facilitate the grabbing of public land remain ﬁrmly in
place (Ndung’u  int.). Indeed the Permanent Secretary in the
Ministry of Lands, Dorothy Angote, recently admitted at a press
conference that two high-ranking ministry ofﬁcials had gone missing
after they were alleged to have been found working with a lawyer to
forge land documents (The Standard ..). The knowledge that
corrupt professionals have been spared the legal and professional
consequences of their actions – and in some cases actually rewarded for
their complicity – functions only to deepen Kenyans’ abiding distrust
of administrative authorities and professionals, with far-reaching
implications for the rule of law and access to justice.
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. The government was widely held to be suppressing the report (Ghai  int.). Members of
Parliament repeatedly requested that it be released, but were told this would happen ‘once the
Cabinet peruses through the contents and deliberates on it’ (Hansard ..: –). In 
MPs expressed concern that the report had still not been released and was being ignored (Hansard
..: ). Even after its release, MPs stated the report had not been circulated and was
‘impossible’ to ﬁnd (Hansard ..: ). For an account of the difﬁculties faced in getting a
range of inquiry reports released, see KHRC .
. A Land Title Tribunal is one of four new institutions the Ndung’u commission recommended
be set up, the other three being a Lands Division of the High Court, a National Land Commission,
and a Task Force on Land (RoK : –).
. ‘The categories of public land highlighted . . . are subject to various laws which prescribe the
legal procedures to be followed if they are to be allocated to private individuals or companies. There
are several laws the provisions of which must be followed by the Government to create private title to
public land. The main laws in this regard are: The Constitution of Kenya, ; The Government
Lands Act,  (Cap ); The Registration of Titles Act,  (Cap ); The Trust Land Act,
 (Cap ); The Land Adjudication Act,  (Cap ); The Registered Land Act,  (Cap
); The Forests Act,  (Cap ); The Physical Planning Act,  (Cap ); The Wildlife
Management and Conservation Act,  (Cap ); and The Survey Act,  (Cap ). It is
important to note that ‘even after these actions have taken by the Minister . . . the provisions of the
Government Lands Act and other Planning and Environmental Legislation would have to be strictly
followed before such lands can be legally allocated’ (RoK : ).
. Included in public land are: urban, state corporations’ and ministries’ lands; settlement
schemes and trust land; and forest lands, national parks, game reserves, wetlands, riparian reserves,
protected areas, museums and historical monuments.
. Indeed, the Ndung’u report identiﬁes seven cases in which to recommend revocation in which
the judiciary itself was illegally allocated land (RoK : Annex I: ; Southall ).
. The aggregate index developed by Transparency International is derived from a combination
of ﬁve individual indicators, which are: the likelihood of bribery, prevalence of bribery, average size of
bribe, share of bribery, and scale of bribery.
. The ICC Kenya Monitor website recently stated: ‘Given the past practice of ofﬁcials facing
corruption allegations being appointed to sensitive positions, the current constitution now prohibits
people who face such allegations from serving in public ofﬁce. The allegations against Tobiko are
certainly a test of this new constitutional standard and parliament, as well as Tobiko’ (ICC Kenya
Monitor ..).
. Klopp (: –) provides an important account of resistance to land grabbing in Kenya,
notably in Westlands – a prime real-estate area. Market members were concerned when surveyors
arrived in  to measure out the ‘undeveloped’ land. Francis Karani, a former Nairobi
commissioner, arrived with fraudulent documents and announced that he had been given the
land. Acting on behalf of Salima enterprises, he quickly put the plot up for sale. After getting no
response from their repeated pleas to the president and local politicians, market members chose to
resist their eviction. Street children were recruited and trained to help ﬁght off policemen and
private security guards. However, stall-holders also associated their struggle with all Kenyans whose
land had been taken.
. A signiﬁcant amount of land is affected by the phenomenon of the local land grabbing. On the
global plane, the World Bank estimated in  that million hectares of land had been subject to
land deals by , with % of these deals taking place in Africa (Deininger & Byerlee ). Data
on local land grabbing is harder to come by, in part because the assessment contained in the
Ndung’u report is incomplete. However, although the number of hectares will not be as great as that
given for the global land grabbing, much of the land covered by Ndung’u is of high value, particularly
in Kenyan cities and towns where urban growth has caused land values to rise steeply.
. In contrast, groups such as Via Campesina have stated that ‘no principle in the world can
justify land grabbing’. ‘The World Bank’s idealistic targets for donor responsibility (who could
possibly be against them?) legitimise a process of commodiﬁcation of African land, whether or not by
Western interests’ (Bush et al. : ).
. Far from being punished for complicity in land grabbing, in one well-known instance a key
professional implicated in assisting in land grabbing during the s and named in the Ndung’u
report – in this case, a surveyor – has been rewarded with a seat in parliament.
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